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Abstract:  
This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially 
depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social 
welfare increases with corporate tax. When the government grants uniform output 
subsidies, we show that bilateral CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under unilateral 
CSR but bilateral CSR is always beneficial to society. However, when the government 
grants discriminatory output subsidies which yield different levels of unilateral CSR, we 
show that domestic CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under foreign CSR. In an 
endogenous CSR choice game, domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when 
corporate tax is low (high) under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR could be a Nash 
equilibrium when corporate tax is low under the discriminatory subsidy. 
Keywords: corporate profit tax; corporate social responsibility; endogenous CSR choice 
game 
JEL classifications: D43 , H21 , L21 
1. Introduction 
As globalization increasingly prevails, domestic industries in most countries are concentrated by 
a few large foreign-owned firms, which account for a substantial share of aggregate international 
trade.1 The acquisition of domestic firms’ stocks by those firms is also a widespread, visible 
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 Bernard et al. (2018) reviewed the shares of aggregate trade in international economics and provided 
strong evidence in support of interdependencies and complementarities between the margins of foreign-
invested global firms and their international participation. 
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phenomenon.2 For example, the French automotive company Renault acquired a 36.8% equity 
stake in Nissan Motor in 1999. There are more recent examples in the global energy, airline, and 
steel industries in the world. In the last decade, we have witnessed a rapid development of new 
energy vehicles. According to the electric vehicle world sales database, the world annual sales 
volume was 10,000 units in 2012, while it quickly increased to 2 million units in 2018. In 
particular, China's new energy vehicle sales accounted for 56% of global sales, which can be 
attributed to the sustainable fiscal subsidies provided by the Chinese government since 2013. As 
the champion in global energy vehicle sales ranked by OEM group 2018, the American Tesla 
Motors decided to build factories in China in 2018 to compete with some local new energy vehicle 
companies, such as BYD, Basic BJEV, et al. 
In the process of globalization, on the other hand, the popularity of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) by global firms has also grown rapidly in recent years.3 Some practical 
examples include GE’s Ecomagination program, Nestlé’s Creating Shared Values, and Unilever’s 
Simple Living Plan. Furthermore, it is becoming more common to suggest global standards of 
international CSR for global firms. For example, the European Commission promotes CSR in the 
EU and encourages foreign-owned firms to adhere to international guidelines and principles. The 
Global Reporting Initiative provides a globally applicable framework for drawing up 
sustainability reports in accordance with internationally recognized criteria.4 
Both international acquisitions and CSR activities by foreign-owned firms have now become 
imperative global business strategies. As they have significant welfare implications on the design 
of government policies, recent research on international oligopoly markets with heterogeneous 
objective functions has analyzed different forms of market competition where profit-maximizing 
private firms may compete with other private firms that have adopted various CSR activities.5 
Accordingly, recent theoretical studies have also examined the effect of CSR on tariffs and 
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 Alley (1997) described the Japanese and U.S. automotive industries and provided a series of reasons firms 
acquire passive participation shares in other firms. For more discussion, see Gilo and Spiegel (2004), 
Barcena-Ruiz and Olaizola (2007), and Halm (2009). 
3
 Various surveys have confirmed the phenomenon that firms are concerned with CSR, such as KPMG 
(2013, 2015) and the UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study (2010, 2013). For comprehensive 
discussions on CSR research, see Bénabou and Tirole (2010), Schreck (2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack 
(2012), Crifo and Forget (2015), and Kim et al. (2019). 
4
 The ISO 26000 guidance on social responsibility was published in 2010, but the updated OECD guidelines 
for foreign-invested enterprises, and the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, were released 
in 2011. For comprehensive discussions, see Aaronson (2007), Vidal-Leon (2013), and Xu and Lee (2019). 
5
 The heterogeneity of objectives among firms has emerged as an important research topic. Recent research 
has investigated various aspects of CSR, including horizontal competition, vertical relationships, 
environmental concerns, international trade, and more. For recent discussions, see Leal et al. (2018), 
Manasakis et al. (2018), Xu and Lee (2019), and Lee and Park (2019), among others. 
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welfare in international trade, such as Wang et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2014), Manasakis et al. 
(2018), Liu et al. (2018), and Xu and Lee (2019). However, these works took the level of CSR as 
an exogenously given variable that was a normative goal established in the social contract.  
From a shareholder’s viewpoint, CSR is an instrument of the firm’s choice variables to 
engage in a global business strategy that reflects a management’s incentive contracts. For example, 
Starbucks increases its demand by buying fair-trade coffee and tea, and other firms heavily 
advertise their organic products. This enhances their reputations and increases the firms’ values. 
Similarly, some foreign-owned firms focus a fair amount of attention on image signaling concerns, 
and thus provide incentives for employee engagement in community service, which boosts their 
public relations with local communities and attracts motivated employees in the home country.6 
Accordingly, recent papers have formulated a model of strategic choice of CSR from the strategic 
motivation of adopting CSR behaviors, and showed that profit maximization could motivate a 
firm to engage in CSR. 7  To our knowledge, however, studies on the foreign-owned firms’ 
strategic utilization of CSR initiatives under international acquisitions and the interactions with 
governmental policies are limited.  
There are several definitions used in the CSR literature, even for the purpose of the profit-
maximizing or so-called “business” case. 8  Moreover, CSR incentive contracts may reflect 
different corporate governance, resulting from different interest group controls, in which 
consumer interest is important (Königstein and Müller, 2001; Planer-Friedrich and Sahm, 2018). 
As an interesting case of strategic CSR in a market transaction, we regard consumer surplus as a 
proxy for CSR, which is widely accepted in the literature.9 In this case, the firm with CSR 
activities is defined as a profit-oriented private firm with a concern for consumer surplus as a CSR 
initiative. 
This paper investigates the strategic relationship between consumer-oriented CSR initiatives 
and international acquisition, and examines the effect of government policies on strategic CSR. 
                                                          
6
 See Besley and Ghatak (2005), Brekke and Nyborg (2008), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). 
7
 Note that CSR firms can earn higher profits, but a higher degree of CSR might not be beneficial to society. 
On this point, see Goering (2012), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015), Liu et al. 
(2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2016), Fanti and Buccella (2017), 
and Hino and Zennyo (2017). 
8
 Siegel and Vitaliano (2007), Carroll and Shabana (2010), and Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2016) provide 
empirical evidence and surveys on the business case. 
9
 Many studies formulated CSR initiatives by utilizing a theoretical model in which the private firm adopts 
consumer surplus as a proxy for its own CSR concerns. Specifically, a CSR initiative combines both 
profitability and consumer surplus. For example, see Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013), 
Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Lambertini and Tampiere (2015), Kopel (2015), Leal et al. (2018), and 
Garcia et al. (2018a, b), among others. 
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In particular, we address the strategic motivations for CSR arising from the interactions between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms under government public policies such as corporate profit 
taxes and output subsidies. 10  Interestingly, we show that there exists the strategic effect of 
corporate profit tax on the strategic CSR and output subsidy policy.11 This finding is important to 
the policymakers because, in the literature of microeconomics, corporate profit taxes are neutral 
toward firm behaviors. 
In a duopoly model of Cournot competition, we examine the governmental policies facing 
firms’ strategic CSR activities and summarize our findings as follows: First, the strategic level of 
CSR decreases while social welfare increases with corporate tax. Second, unilateral CSR case in 
which only one firm adopts CSR leads to a higher level of CSR than that under bilateral CSR case 
in which both firms adopt CSR. Third, the optimal output subsidy increases with corporate tax 
while it decreases with foreign penetration, and the optimal output tax is possible when the foreign 
penetration is high and the corporate tax is low. Fourth, the welfare effects of CSR crucially 
depend on both corporate profit tax and foreign acquisition, but bilateral CSR always yields the 
highest welfare irrespective of corporate tax or foreign penetration. Fifth, we consider an 
endogenous choice game of CSR between the two firms and examine the equilibrium choice of 
CSR. When each firm decides whether to engage in CSR at the beginning of the game, we show 
that domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high). Finally, we 
consider a discriminatory subsidy where the government grants different subsidies to the firms. 
We find that foreign CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) in an 
endogenous choice game of CSR under the discriminatory subsidy; however, neither is socially 
desirable. Therefore, an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR guidelines is necessary in 
certain cases with a lower corporate tax. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of 
Cournot competition in which a domestic firm and a foreign-owned firm compete with CSR 
initiatives under output subsidy and corporate tax policies. We then analyze the market 
equilibrium under different choices of CSR in Section 3. We then compare the equilibrium 
outcomes among the four models and extend to an endogenous choice game of CSR in Section 4. 
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 Corporate tax rates substantially differ across countries and foreign-owned firms actively engage in 
intrafirm transactions across borders. That is, there is a strategic relationship between corporate tax policies 
and foreign-owned firms’ incentive to manipulate strategic practices to avoid tax payments. See Choi et al. 
(2020) for some policy discussions. 
11
 It is well known that corporate profit taxes are neutral toward firms’ profit-maximizing behaviors. 
However, Liu et al. (2018) demonstrated a non-zero relationship between a public firm’s behavior and 
corporate taxation policies in a mixed market. 
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In Section 5, we further examine the discriminatory subsidy. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. The Model  
We consider a duopoly market with two private firms that produce homogeneous products, but 
with possibly different objectives. Firm 1 and firm 2 are the pure profit-oriented private firms 
and both of them might engage in CSR activities. We assume that firm 1 is a domestic firm fully 
owned by domestic investors, while firm 2 is a foreign firm owned by both domestic and foreign 
investors.12 
Inverse demand is given by: 𝑝 = 1 − 𝑄, where 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 is the market output and 𝑞1 
and 𝑞2 denote the quantities supplied by domestic firm 1 and foreign-owned firm 2, respectively. 
The cost function of firm i is identical and given as: 𝐶(𝑞𝑖) = 12 𝑞𝑖2 , where 𝑖 = 1, 2 . The 
government imposes a corporate profit tax of 𝜏 ∈ (0,1) on both firms, which is exogenously 
given.13 Further, the government might provide a production subsidy 𝑠 per unit of output to the 
two firms in this market.14  Note that the output subsidy becomes an output tax when it is 
negative. 
The profits of the firms are as follows:15 𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏)(𝑝𝑞𝑖 − 12𝑞𝑖2 + 𝑠𝑞𝑖).                                                                                                  (1) 
It is assumed that each firm maximizes its profit as a pure private firm, and both of them can 
strategically choose profit-oriented CSRs. In particular, we assume that the firm is in a managerial 
delegation contract in which output production decisions are delegated to a manager. That is, the 
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 We assume that the foreign-owned firm could be an exclusive foreign-owned enterprise (𝛽 = 1) or a sino-
foreign joint venture 𝛽 ∈ (0,1), which is the most common method used by multinational corporations that 
enter the local market. 
13
 PwC reported in 2013 that 95% of countries around the world levy taxes on corporate profits. The report 
Paying Taxes 2012 showed that, on average, it accounts for 36% of the total tax rate for firms, and more 
than half of the economies in the world levy a statutory income tax rate between 15% and 30%. As 
mentioned in Liu et al. (2018), it may be unrealistic to assume that the government can choose a specific 
corporate tax in a specific industry or market. Thus, we assume that the corporate tax is exogenously given.  
14
 This assumption is prevalent in reality, such as output subsidies granted to the electric vehicle industry 
in China. For example, the Chinese government has, since 2013, continued to provide similar subsidies to 
both local and foreign-owned vehicle firms, including Tesla, LEXUS, and BMW. 
15
 We can consider the other case, in which the government does not impose corporate profit tax on the 
subsidy part. That is, direct financial subsidies from the government can be exempted from the corporate 
tax base. Then, we can formulate the profit function as 𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏)(𝑝𝑖𝑞i − 𝑞𝑖2 2⁄ ) + 𝑠𝑞𝑖 , but we can show 
that main results are the same with those in the current model.  
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owner of the firm specifies a degree of CSR as an incentive contract with the manager to maximize 
the profit.16 In this managerial delegation contract, the manager is assumed to maximize the profit 
of the firm plus a fraction of consumer surplus in output production that is imposed by the owner. 
Thus, the objective function of the manager of the firm is given as follows: 𝑉𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝐶S,                                                                                              (2) 
where 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [0,1] represents the level of CSR of firm i and 𝐶𝑆 = 12 𝑄2 is the consumer surplus. 
Note that a consumer-friendly CSR initiative is regarded as that the firm adopts consumer surplus 
as a proxy for its own CSR concerns. Then, the CSR incentive combines profitability and 
consumer surplus in a convex combination formula. When the firm engaged in CSR assigns a 
weight to consumer surplus in its objective function, it is sensible to assume that the firm places 
a higher weight on output, and that it produces aggressively. Here, 𝛼𝑖 = 0 denotes a pure profit-
maximizing private firm. Finally, we take the strategic CSR perspective that the owner 
strategically chooses its level of CSR in order to maximize its profit 𝜋𝑖 in (1). That is, the firms 
will adopt strategic CSR only when CSR increases its profitability. 
Considering the share of foreign ownership, we define producer surplus as: 𝑃𝑆 = 𝜋1 + (1 −𝛽)𝜋2 , where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1]  is the foreign penetration in the foreign-owned firm, which can be 
potentially affected by policymakers acting on capital liberalization. 17  We define domestic 
welfare as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax revenue, 𝑇 = 𝜏 ∑(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 −12 𝑞𝑖2 + 𝑠𝑞𝑖), minus the subsidy expenditure, 𝑆 = 𝑠 ∑ 𝑞𝑖: 𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑃𝑆 + 𝑇 − 𝑆.                                                                                                       (3) 
This study considers different scenarios regarding the choice of CSR unilaterally or bilaterally 
under government policies in a certain industry. In particular, when the two firms decide whether 
to engage in CSR activities or not in the beginning, we classified with four scenarios: “bilateral 
CSR” where both firms adopt CSR bilaterally, “domestic CSR only” or “foreign CSR only” where 
either one of two firms adopts CSR unilaterally, and “no CSR” where no firms adopt CSR. In 
each scenario, the timing of each game is as follows. In the first stage, the government decides 
the level of output subsidy. In the second stage, given the level of subsidy 𝑠, the firm chooses the 
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 In the managerial delegation contract, the firm may strategically use CSR initiative as a commitment 
device to expand the outputs and thus the firm that adopts CSR obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking 
competitors. For recent discussion on the theoretical relationship between managerial delegation and CSR, 
see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Lee and Park (2019), and Garcia et al. (2019) 
17
 We can interpret the foreign penetration as indicating the level of market openness in financial markets. 
Thus, we assume that the foreign penetration rate is also exogenously given. See Haraguchi and Matsumura 
(2014), Xu et al. (2017), and Lee et al. (2018). 
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level of CSR to maximizes its own profit.18 In the final stage, given the level of CSR 𝛼𝑖, both 
firms compete in quantities. We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium using backward 
induction.  
3. The Analysis 
3.1 Bilateral CSR 
We consider a bilateral case in which two firms simultaneously engage in CSR activities. In the 
last stage, both firms choose the outputs. For a domestic firm, the differentiation of 𝑉1 in Eq. (2) 
with respect to 𝑞1 yields   𝜕𝑉1𝜕𝑞1 = (1 − 𝜏)(1 + 𝑠 − 3𝑞1 − 𝑞2) + (𝑞1 + 𝑞2)𝛼1 = 0.                                                      (4) 
For a foreign-owned firm, the differentiation of 𝑉2 in Eq. (2) with respect to 𝑞2 yields   𝜕𝑉2𝜕𝑞2 = (1 − 𝜏)(1 + 𝑠 − 𝑞1 − 3𝑞2) + (𝑞1 + 𝑞2)𝛼2 = 0.                                                      (5) 
From Eqs. (4) and (5), we obtain the following equilibrium outputs:  𝑞1 = (1+𝑠)(2−2𝜏+𝛼1−𝛼2)2(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2)   and  𝑞2 = (1+𝑠)(2−2𝜏−𝛼1+𝛼2)2(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2) .                                                        (6) 
The profits of the domestic and foreign-owned firms are respectively  𝜋1 = (1+𝑠)2(1−𝜏)(2−2𝜏+𝛼1−𝛼2)(6−6𝜏−5𝛼1−3𝛼2)8(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2)2 , 𝜋2 = (1+𝑠)2(1−𝜏)(2−2𝜏−𝛼1+𝛼2)(6−6𝜏−3𝛼1−5𝛼2)8(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2)2 .                                                                     (7) 
In the second stage, each firm chooses the level of CSR to maximize the profits in (7). The 
differentiation of 𝜋𝑖 in Eq. (7) with respect to 𝛼𝑖 yields19 𝛼1 = (1−𝜏−𝛼2)(2−2𝜏−𝛼2)11−11𝜏−3𝛼2 , 𝛼2 = (1−𝜏−𝛼1)(2−2𝜏−𝛼1)11−11𝜏−3𝛼1 .                                                               (8) 
Note that the strategic CSR activities can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes, 
depending on the level of corporate tax, that is, 𝜕𝛼𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑗 > 0 if 𝜏 ∈ (1 − (11+2√10)𝛼227 , 1 − (11−2√10)𝛼227 ) 
and 𝜕𝛼𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑗 < 0 otherwise, where 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. This implies that both firms’ CSR activities can 
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 Note that the choice of output subsidy is policy level while CSR choice is strategy level and thus policy 
is likely to be irreversible and less flexible, compared to the firm’s strategy. Further, even though the CSR 
level can be announced before the subsidy policy, the opportunistic firm can easily change its CSR strategy 
by observing the output subsidy rate before determining output level. Note that this case provides the same 
result as the case of simultaneous choice between CSR and subsidies. 
19
 It is evident that the second-order conditions for the maximization problems (of profits and welfare) are 
satisfied among the models. 
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be strategic substitutes when corporate tax is either low or high while, they are independent of 
output subsidy and foreign penetration.  
Combining two reaction functions in Eq. (8), we have the optimal level of CSR of the firm: 𝛼𝑖𝐵 = (7−√41)(1−𝜏)4 ,                                                                                                                (9) 
where superscript “B” represents the equilibrium outcome under Bilateral CSR and 𝑖 = 1, 2. From 
Eq. (9), both firms adopt the same level of CSR where 0 < 𝛼𝑖𝐵 < 1. That is, both domestic and 
foreign-owned firms always engage in CSR activities, which decreases with corporate tax rate, 
for instance, 𝜕𝛼𝑖𝐵𝜕𝜏 < 0. Thus, a higher corporate tax discourages the profit-oriented CSR. However, 
CSR is independent of output subsidy and foreign penetration, that is, 𝜕𝛼𝑖𝐵𝜕𝑠 = 0 and 𝜕𝛼𝑖𝐵𝜕𝛽 = 0. 
The resulting social welfare is 𝑊 = 2(1+𝑠)(2√41−4−6𝑠−𝛽(√41−4)(1+𝑠)(1−𝜏))(1+√41)2 .                                                                              (10) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the level of subsidy to maximize social welfare. The 
differentiating of 𝑊 in Eq. (10) with respect to 𝑠 yields 𝑠𝐵 = √41−5−𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏)6+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏) .                                                                                                     (11) 
Then, we have that 𝑠𝐵 <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐵 = 1 − 21−√4125𝛽 . Note that 𝑠𝐵 ≥ 0 if 𝛽 ∈ [0, 21−√4125 ] (since 𝜏𝐵 ≤ 0) while 𝑠𝐵 < 0 if 𝛽 ∈ (21−√4125 , 1] and 𝜏 ∈ (0, 𝜏𝐵). Thus, the government taxes the output 
when the foreign penetration is high and the corporate tax is low enough. Moreover, the optimal 
output subsidy increases with corporate tax rate, while it decreases with foreign penetration, 
namely, 𝜕𝑠𝐵𝜕𝜏 > 0  and 𝜕𝑠𝐵𝜕𝛽 < 0 . This implies that subsidy and corporate tax policies are 
complements, while subsidy and capital liberalization policies are substitutes. 
The equilibrium market output and price are 𝑄𝐵 = 46+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏)  and  𝑝𝐵 = 2+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏)6+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏).                                                          (12) 
Note that the market output increases with corporate tax, while decreases with foreign penetration, 
for instance, 𝜕𝑄𝐵𝜕𝜏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑄𝐵𝜕𝛽 < 0. Thus, an increase in corporate tax leads to a higher subsidy, 
increasing the market output, while an increase in foreign penetration in the foreign-owned firm 
leads to a lower subsidy, decreasing the market output.  
The profit of the firm is, respectively  𝜋𝑖𝐵 = 2(√41−4)(1−𝜏)(6+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏))2.                                                                                                    (13) 
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Note that the profit of the firm decreases with corporate tax rate and foreign penetration, that is, 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝐵𝜕𝜏 < 0 and 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝐵𝜕𝛽 < 0. Note that the profits of the two firms are the same since both firms engaged 
in the same level of CSR at equilibrium, namely, 𝜋1𝐶 = 𝜋2𝐶. 
Finally, the social welfare is  𝑊𝐵 = 26+𝛽(√41−4)(1−𝜏).                                                                                                             (14) 
Note that the welfare increases with corporate tax, but decreases with foreign penetration, for 
instance, 𝜕𝑊𝐵𝜕𝜏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑊𝐵𝜕𝛽 < 0. In other words, from the view of social welfare, the government 
intends to improve the rate of corporate tax, but reduce the level of market openness in financial 
markets.  
3.2 Domestic CSR only 
We consider one unilateral case in which only domestic firm engages in CSR activities. In the 
last stage, substituting 𝛼2 = 0 into Eqs. (6) and (7) yield the following profit of the domestic firm: 𝜋1 = (1+𝑠)2(1−𝜏)(2−2𝜏+𝛼1)(6−6𝜏−5𝛼1)8(4−4𝜏−𝛼1)2 .                                                                                (15) 
In the second stage, the differentiation of 𝜋1 in Eq. (15) with respect to 𝛼1 yields 𝛼1𝐷 = 2(1−𝜏)11 .                                                                                                                            (16) 
where superscript “D” represents the equilibrium outcome when only Domestic firm engages in 
CSR activities. From Eq. (16), domestic firm always adopts CSR activities where 0 < 𝛼1𝐷 < 1, 
which decreases with corporate tax rate, that is, 𝜕𝛼1𝐷𝜕𝜏 < 0. However, CSR is also independent of 
output subsidy and foreign penetration, namely, 𝜕𝛼1𝐷𝜕𝑠 = 0 and 𝜕𝛼1𝐷𝜕𝛽 = 0.  
The resulting social welfare is 𝑊 = (1+𝑠)(280−𝑠(182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏)−75𝛽(1−𝜏))882 .                                                                               (17) 
In the first stage, the differentiating of 𝑊 in Eq. (17) with respect to 𝑠 yields 𝑠𝐷 = 49−75𝛽(1−𝜏)182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏.                                                                                                                (18) 
From Eq. (18), we have that 𝑠𝐷 <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐷 = 1 − 4975𝛽. Note that 𝑠𝐷 ≥ 0 if 𝛽 ∈ [0, 4975] (since 𝜏𝐷 ≤ 0) while 𝑠𝐷 < 0 when 𝛽 ∈ (4975, 1] and 𝜏 ∈ (0, 𝜏𝐷). Thus, the government taxes the output 
when the foreign penetration is high and the corporate tax is low enough. Moreover, the optimal 
output subsidy increases with corporate tax rate, while it decreases with foreign penetration, for 
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instance, 𝜕𝑠𝐷𝜕𝜏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑠𝐷𝜕𝛽 < 0. 
The equilibrium market output and price are 𝑄𝐷 = 121182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏  and  𝑝𝐷 = 61+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏.                                                                 (19) 
Note that the market output increases with corporate tax, while it decreases with foreign 
penetration, that is, 𝜕𝑄𝐷𝜕𝜏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑄𝐷𝜕𝛽 < 0.  
The profit of the firm is respectively  𝜋1𝐷 = 5082(1−𝜏)(182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏)2  and  𝜋2𝐷 = 9075(1−𝜏)2(182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏)2                                                         (20) 
Note that the profit of the firm decreases with corporate tax rate and foreign penetration, namely, 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝐷𝜕𝜏 < 0 and 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝐷𝜕𝛽 < 0. In addition, note that domestic firm engaged in CSR only always earns 
more profit than that of the foreign-owned firm under the output subsidy, for instance, 𝜋1𝐷 > 𝜋2𝐷. 
This is why the domestic firm has an incentive to engage in CSR activities when the foreign-
owned firm does not adopt CSR. 
Finally, the social welfare is  𝑊𝐷 = 1212(182+75𝛽−75𝛽𝜏).                                                                                                             (21) 
Note that the welfare increases with corporate tax, but it decreases with foreign penetration, that 
is, 𝜕𝑊𝐷𝜕𝜏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑊𝐷𝜕𝛽 < 0. 
3.3 Foreign CSR only 
We consider the other unilateral case in which only foreign-owned firm engages in CSR. In the 
last stage, substituting 𝛼1 = 0 into Eqs. (6) and (7) yields the following profit of the foreign-
owned firm: 𝜋2 = (1+𝑠)2(2+𝛼−2𝜏)(1−𝜏)(6−5𝛼−6𝜏)8(4−𝛼−4𝜏)2 .                                                                                   (22) 
In the second stage, the differentiation of 𝜋2 in Eq. (22) with respect to 𝛼2 yields 𝛼2𝐹 = 2(1−𝜏)11 ,                                                                                                                             (23) 
where superscript “F” represents the equilibrium outcome when only Foreign-owned firm 
engages in CSR activities. From Eq. (23), foreign-owned firm always engages in CSR where 0 <𝛼2𝐹 < 1. Note that the strategic levels under the unilateral CSR are the same, namely, 𝛼2𝐹 = 𝛼1𝐷, 
and it also decreases with corporate tax rate, but is independent of output subsidy and foreign 
penetration. 
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The resulting social welfare is 𝑊 = (1+𝑠)(20−13𝑠−6𝛽−6𝑠𝛽+6𝛽𝜏+6𝑠𝛽𝜏)63 .                                                                                       (24) 
In the first stage, the differentiating of 𝑊 in Eq. (24) with respect to 𝑠 yields 𝑠𝐹 = 7−12𝛽(1−𝜏)2(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏).                                                                                                                 (25) 
From Eq. (25), we have that 𝑠𝐹 <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐹 = 1 − 712𝛽. Note that 𝑠𝐹 ≥ 0 if 𝛽 ∈ [0, 712] (since 𝜏𝐹 ≤ 0), while 𝑠𝐹 < 0 when 𝛽 ∈ ( 712, 1] and 𝜏 ∈ (0, 𝜏𝐹). That is, the government taxes the output 
when the foreign penetration is high and the corporate tax is low enough. Moreover, the optimal 
subsidy increases with corporate tax rate, while it decreases with foreign penetration.  
The resulting market output and price are 𝑄𝐹 = 12114(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏)  and  𝑝𝐹 = 61+84𝛽(1−𝜏)14(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏).                                                               (26) 
Note that the market output increases with corporate tax, while it decreases with foreign 
penetration.  
The profits of the firms are respectively  𝜋1𝐹 = 9075(1−𝜏)392(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏)2  and  𝜋2𝐹 = 363(1−𝜏)14(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏)2.                                                            (27) 
Note that the profits of firms decrease with corporate tax rate and foreign penetration. In addition, 
note that foreign-owned firm engaged in CSR only always earns more profit than that of the 
domestic firm under the output subsidy, for instance, 𝜋1𝐹 < 𝜋2𝐹. This is why the foreign-owned 
firm has an incentive to engage in CSR activities when the domestic firm does not adopt CSR. 
Finally, the social welfare is  𝑊𝐹 = 12128(13+6𝛽−6𝛽𝜏).                                                                                                                 (28) 
Note that social welfare increases with corporate tax but decreases with foreign penetration. 
3.4 No CSR 
We finally consider a case in which no firm engages in CSR. In the last stage, substituting 𝛼𝑖 = 0 
into Eq. (6), we can obtain the output of the two firms. Thus, the resulting social welfare is: 𝑊 = (1+𝑠)(20−13𝑠−6𝛽−6𝑠𝛽+6𝛽𝜏+6𝑠𝛽𝜏)63 .                                                                                       (29) 
In the first stage, the differentiating of 𝑊 in Eq. (29) with respect to 𝑠 yields 𝑠𝑁 = 2−3𝛽(1−𝜏)3(2+𝛽−𝛽𝜏),                                                                                                                      (30) 
where superscript “N” represents the equilibrium outcome when No firm engages in CSR 
activities. From Eq. (30), we have that 𝑠𝑁 <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝑁 = 1 − 23𝛽. Note that 𝑠𝑁 ≥ 0 if 𝛽 ∈
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[0, 23] (since 𝜏𝑁 ≤ 0) while 𝑠𝑁 < 0 when 𝛽 ∈ (23, 1] and 𝜏 ∈ (0, 𝜏𝑁). Thus, the government taxes 
the output when the foreign penetration is high and the corporate tax is low enough. Moreover, 
the optimal output subsidy increases with corporate tax rate, while it decreases with foreign 
penetration.  
The equilibrium market output and price are 𝑄𝑁 = 46+3𝛽−3𝛽𝜏  and  𝑝𝑁 = 2+3𝛽−3𝛽𝜏6+3𝛽−3𝛽𝜏.                                                                              (31) 
Note that the market output increases with corporate tax, while it decreases with foreign 
penetration.  
The profit of the firm is respectively  𝜋1𝑁 = 𝜋2𝑁 = 2(1−𝜏)3(2+𝛽−𝛽𝜏)2.                                                                                                     (32) 
Note that the profit of the firm decreases with corporate tax rate and foreign penetration.  
Finally, the social welfare is 𝑊𝑁 = 26+3𝛽−3𝛽𝜏.                                                                                                                        (33) 
Note that the welfare increases with corporate tax, but it decreases with foreign penetration. 
4. Comparisons and Discussions  
4.1 Comparisons 
We first compare the results in each equilibrium and provide some findings on the strategic levels 
of CSR and relations with government policies.20 
Proposition 1: The unilateral CSR leads to a higher level of CSR than that under bilateral CSR. 
Proposition 1 states that the competitive choice of strategic CSR in which both firms engage 
in CSR activities simultaneously leads to a lower level of CSR than the unilateral case in which 
only one firm engages in CSR activities. This is because the firm that engages in CSR can be 
more aggressive and thus can produce more output to enlarge its market share and improve its 
profit under quantity competition. However, this effect softens when the rival firm also adopts 
CSR to increase output, which will produce too much output thereby flooding the market. 
Proposition 2: The strategic CSR decreases with corporate tax, while it is independent of output 
subsidy and foreign penetration.  
                                                          
20
 The proofs of lemmas are presented in the Appendix, while the propositions are simple and thus omitted. 
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Proposition 2 states that under a higher corporate tax, both firms choose a lower level of 
CSR and produce less output, that is, there is a negative relationship between CSR strategy and 
corporate tax policy. This result implies that the corporate tax can affect market outcomes, which 
might distort allocation efficiency through output production in the presence of strategic CSR. 
This is an interesting policy finding. In the previous literature without CSR, it is well known that 
corporate tax is neutral to the firm’s product strategy in the market; and thus, allocation efficiency 
is independent of corporate tax rate. However, the corporate tax policy is crucial for the 
government to improve welfare when the firm can choose the level of CSR strategically. On the 
other hand, the subsidy policy does not affect the decision of CSR for the firms. This result is also 
interesting in that the firm’s strategic decision of CSR to increase the output is neutral to the 
government’s subsidy policy to encourage the firms to produce more output. This implies that the 
output subsidy policy has a direct effect on the output, but does not have an indirect effect on the 
output through CSR strategies. 
Proposition 3: (i) The optimal output subsidy increases with corporate tax and decreases with 
foreign penetration. (ii) The output tax is optimal when the foreign penetration is high and 
corporate tax is low enough.  
The first part of Proposition 3 represents that the output subsidy and corporate tax policies 
are complements; an increase in corporate tax leads to a higher output subsidy at equilibrium. 
However, the government’s policies between output subsidy and foreign ownership are strategic 
substitutes: an increase in foreign penetration leads to a lower domestic surplus, thus resulting in 
a lower subsidy at equilibrium. The second part of Proposition 3 indicates that when the foreign 
investors become major stakeholders of the foreign-owned firm, but the corporate tax rate is low, 
the government can impose an output tax on the firm, instead of subsidy. Since the foreign-owned 
firm with a higher foreign penetration (more than 50%) does not contribute to the producer surplus 
when the corporate tax is low enough, the government has to shrink the quantities produced by 
the foreign-owned firm by charging a negative output subsidy. 
Lemma 1: The ranks of optimal output subsidies among the four models are as follows: 
(i)  0 > 𝑠𝐷 ≥ 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐹 when 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏1; 
(ii) 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐵 ≥ 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏1 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏2;  
(ii-1) 0 ≥ 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏1 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝑁;  
(ii-2) 𝑠𝑁 > 0 ≥ 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏𝑁 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐷; 
(ii-3) 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 0 ≥ 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏𝐷 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐵; 
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(ii-4) 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐵 > 0 ≥ 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏𝐵 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐹; 
(ii-5) 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐵 ≥ 𝑠𝐹 > 0 when 𝜏𝐹 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏2; 
(iii) 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐹 > 𝑠𝐵 > 0 when 𝜏2 < 𝜏 < 1. 
Lemma 1 shows the policy relationships between the output subsidy and corporate tax rates. 
Then, we can summarize the findings in Lemma 1 as follows: (a) min{𝑠𝐷 , 𝑠𝑁} > max{𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐹}, 
(b) 𝑠𝐷 >< 𝑠𝑁 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏1, and (c) 𝑠𝐵 >< 𝑠𝐹 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏2. We will provide some explanations on the 
three summaries. First, (a) either domestic CSR or no CSR is always higher than bilateral CSR 
and foreign CSR. This indicates that the cases without foreign CSR require the government to 
provide a higher output subsidy than the cases with foreign CSR. For example, we have that 𝑠𝐷 >𝑠𝐹 even though the levels of CSR under domestic CSR and foreign CSR are the same. This is 
because the profit of the foreign-owned firm could be a channel of welfare leakage to the foreign 
investors, which may lead the government to provide lower subsidy under foreign CSR.  
Second, (b) domestic CSR requires a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is low, while no 
CSR requires a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is relatively high. In particular, when the 
corporate tax is low enough, namely, 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏1 < 𝜏𝑁, we have that 𝑠𝑁 < 𝑠𝐷 < 0. Thus, the 
government imposes an output tax on both firms where that under no CSR is higher than that 
under domestic CSR. Moreover, we have that 𝑠𝑁 ≥ 0 > 𝑠𝐷 when 𝜏𝑁 ≤ 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐷. That is, when the 
corporate tax is intermediate, the government imposes an output tax on two firms under domestic 
CSR and provides an output subsidy to two firms under no CSR. However, when the corporate 
tax is high enough, for instance, 𝜏𝐷 ≤ 𝜏 < 1, we have that 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 ≥ 0. Thus, the government 
provides an output subsidy to both firms where that under no CSR is higher than that under 
domestic CSR.  
Finally, (c) bilateral CSR requires a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is low, while 
foreign CSR requires a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is relatively high. In particular, 
when the corporate tax is low enough, that is, 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏2, we have that 𝑠𝐹 < 𝑠𝐵 < 0. Thus, the 
government imposes an output tax on both firms where that under foreign CSR is higher than that 
under bilateral CSR. However, when the corporate tax is high enough, namely, 𝜏2 < 𝜏 < 1, we 
have that 𝑠𝐹 > 𝑠𝐵 > 0. Thus, the government provides an output subsidy to both firms where that 
under foreign CSR is higher than that under bilateral CSR. 
Proposition 4: The social welfare increases with corporate tax and decreases with foreign 
penetration. 
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Proposition 4 states that an increase in corporate tax leads to higher levels of subsidy and 
market output, resulting in higher consumer surplus, subsidy expenditure, and tax revenue, while 
it reduces two firm’s profits. The former effect outweighs the latter effect and thus, an increase in 
corporate tax makes the society better off. On the other hand, an increase in foreign penetration 
works negatively in both the former and the latter effects and thus, resulting in lower social 
welfare.  
Lemma 2: The welfare ranks among the four models are as follows: 
(i) 𝑊𝐵 > 𝑊𝐷 > 𝑊𝐹 ≥ 𝑊𝑁 when 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏5;  
(ii) 𝑊𝐵 > 𝑊𝐷 ≥ 𝑊𝑁 > 𝑊𝐹 when 𝜏5 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏6;  
(iii) 𝑊𝐵 > 𝑊𝑁 > 𝑊𝐷 > 𝑊𝐹when 𝜏6 < 𝜏 < 1.  
Lemma 2 shows the relationship between the welfare and corporate tax rate. Then, we can 
summarize the findings in Lemma 2 as follows: (a) 𝑊𝐵 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑊𝐷 , 𝑊𝐹 , 𝑊𝑁}, (b) 𝑊𝐷 > 𝑊𝐹, 
(c) 𝑊𝐹 >< 𝑊𝑁 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏5, and (d) 𝑊𝐷 >< 𝑊𝑁 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏6. We will provide some explanations on 
the four summaries. First, (a) bilateral CSR always yields the highest welfare irrespective of 
government policies including output subsidy, corporate tax, or open policy on foreign 
penetration. This is because bilateral CSR yields the largest market output at equilibrium, for 
instance, 𝑄𝐵 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑄𝐷, 𝑄𝐹 , 𝑄𝑁}, and thus it leads to the highest consumer surplus among the 
four models.  
Second, (b) domestic CSR yields a higher welfare than that under foreign CSR, even though 
the strategic levels of CSR are the same. This is because the market output will be higher under 
domestic CSR, that is, 𝑄𝐷 > 𝑄𝐹, since the government provides a higher subsidy, 𝑠𝐷 > 𝑠𝐹, from 
lemma 1. Thus, the less leakage of the welfare under the domestic CSR leads to a higher welfare 
at equilibrium.  
Third, (c) foreign CSR yields a higher welfare when the corporate tax is low, while no CSR 
yields a higher welfare when the corporate tax is relatively high. Thus, there exists a trade-off 
between the foreign CSR and no CSR depending on corporate tax rate. Note that no CSR provides 
a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is relatively high, we have 𝑄𝐹 >< 𝑄𝑁when 𝜏 <> 𝜏5. Thus, 
the welfare effect of a higher CSR by the foreign-owned firm and that of a higher output subsidy 
under no CSR yields the welfare trade-off between the two models. 
Finally, (d) domestic CSR yields a higher social welfare when the corporate tax is low, while 
no CSR yields a higher welfare when the corporate tax is relatively high. There is also a trade-off 
between domestic CSR and no CSR, but the threshold is higher under domestic CSR. Note that 
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no CSR provides a higher subsidy when the corporate tax is relatively high, we have 𝑄𝐷 >< 𝑄𝑁when 𝜏 <> 𝜏6. Again, the welfare effect of a higher CSR by the domestic firm and that of 
a higher output subsidy under no CSR yields the welfare trade-off between the two models. 
4.2 Endogenous CSR Choice Game 
We then offer an extended game in which we consider an endogenous choice of CSR between the 
two firms. Before examining CSR choice game, we compare the profits of the two firms in each 
game. 
Lemma 3: The profit ranks among the four models are as follows: 
(i) 𝜋2𝑁 > 𝜋2𝐹 > 𝜋2𝐷 > 𝜋2𝐵 when 0 < 𝜏 < 1; 
(ii) 𝜋1𝐷 ≥ 𝜋1𝑁 > 𝜋1𝐵 > 𝜋1𝐹 when 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏3; 
(iii) 𝜋1𝑁 > 𝜋1𝐷 > 𝜋1𝐵 ≥ 𝜋1𝐹 when 𝜏3 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏4;  
(iv) 𝜋1𝑁 > 𝜋1𝐷 > 𝜋1𝐹 > 𝜋1𝐵 when 𝜏4 < 𝜏 < 1. 
Lemma 3 shows the relationship between the profits of the two firms and corporate tax rate. 
It states that (i) the foreign-owned firm always obtains the highest profit under no CSR, compared 
to other CSR cases including foreign CSR, irrespective of the corporate tax, while it earns a higher 
profit under foreign CSR than that under bilateral CSR. This is because, although no CSR strategy 
yields relatively smaller output, 𝑞2𝐹 > 𝑞2𝐵 > 𝑞2𝑁 > 𝑞2𝐷, the government provides a higher subsidy 
for a large range, as shown in Lemma 1, namely 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐹}, and 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 when 𝜏1 <𝜏 < 1. 
On the other hand, (ii) states that the domestic firm could obtain the highest profit under 
domestic CSR only when the corporate tax is relatively low. In particular, we can summarize the 
findings in Lemma 3 (ii)~(iv) as follows: (a) 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝜋1𝐷 , 𝜋1𝑁} > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝜋1𝐵, 𝜋1𝐹}, (b) 𝜋1𝐷 >< 𝜋1𝑁 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏3 while 𝜋1𝐵 >< 𝜋1𝐹 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏4. It shows that (a) the profit of domestic firm is always higher 
without foreign firm’s CSR, irrespective of the corporate tax, while the relative profit between 
the cases without and with foreign firm’s CSR depends on corporate tax. Note that domestic CSR 
always yields the largest output of the domestic firm, for instance, 𝑞1𝐷 > 𝑞1𝐵 > 𝑞1𝑁 > 𝑞1𝐹 while 𝑠𝑁 > 𝑠𝐷 > 0 > 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐹  when the corporate tax is low, that is, 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏3 . That is, the 
government provides output subsidy to the domestic firm under no CSR and domestic CSR, and 
imposes an output tax under bilateral CSR and foreign CSR when the corporate tax is low. It 
represents that (b) the domestic firm could benefit from (not) adopting CSR when the corporate 
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tax rate is low (high) irrespective of whether the foreign firm adopts CSR or not. In particular, the 
domestic firm (not) adopting CSR could obtain the highest profit when the corporate tax is low 
(high). 
Finally, we consider an extensive game with endogenous choice of CSR in which each firm 
decides whether to engage in CSR activities or not simultaneously and non-cooperatively before 
the first stage of the previous analysis. Then, we have an endogenous CSR choice game in TABLE 
1.   
[TABLE 1 should be located here.] 
Then, from Lemma 3(i), we have that 𝜋2𝐷 > 𝜋2𝐵  and 𝜋2𝑁 > 𝜋2𝐹 .  This implies that the 
dominant strategy for the foreign-owned firm is no CSR. Further, from Lemma 3(ii) and (iii), we 
have 𝜋1𝐷 >< 𝜋1𝑁 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏3. Thus, we can show that the equilibrium of an endogenous choice of 
CSR between the firms depends on the corporate tax rate and foreign penetration. 
Proposition 5: Domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when the corporate tax is low 
(high), however neither one is socially desirable. 
Proposition 5 shows that domestic CSR is a Nash equilibrium when 𝜏 is low, namely 0 <𝜏 < 𝜏3, while no CSR is a Nash equilibrium when 𝜏 is high, for instance, 𝜏3 < 𝜏 < 1. Moreover, 
both domestic CSR and no CSR are the Nash equilibria when 𝜏 = 𝜏3. However, Lemma 2 reveals 
that neither of the Nash equilibria is socially desirable. Therefore, an appropriate regulatory 
framework for CSR guidelines is necessary in certain cases with a lower corporate tax and a 
higher foreign penetration. 
5. Discriminatory Subsidy  
We now consider a discriminatory subsidy according to which the government grants different 
levels of output subsidies to the firms, 𝑠𝑖, in the first stage. The profit of the firm is 𝜋𝑖 = (1 −𝜏)(𝑝𝑞𝑖 − 12𝑞𝑖2 + 𝑠𝑖𝑞𝑖), and the total subsidy expenditure is 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑖 ∑ 𝑞𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, 2. For simple 
comparisons, we assume that 𝛽 = 1 where the foreign-owned firm is an exclusive foreign-owned 
enterprise. In the below, we analyze the four models under discriminatory subsidies, respectively, 
and then examine an endogenous choice game of CSR. 
First, we consider a bilateral CSR case. In the last stage, the differentiation of 𝑉𝑖 with respect 
to 𝑞𝑖 yields the following outputs:  
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𝑞1 = 2−2𝜏+3𝑠1−3𝜏𝑠1−𝑠2+𝜏𝑠2+𝛼1+𝑠2𝛼1−𝛼2−𝑠1𝛼22(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2) ,  𝑞2 = 2−2𝜏−𝑠1+𝜏𝑠1+3𝑠2−3𝜏𝑠2−𝛼1−𝑠2𝛼1+𝛼2+𝑠1𝛼22(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2) .                                                                    (34) 
The profits of the domestic and foreign-owned firms are respectively  𝜋1 = (1−𝜏)(2−2𝜏+3𝑠1−3𝜏𝑠1−𝑠2+𝜏𝑠2+𝛼1+𝑠2𝛼1−𝛼2−𝑠1𝛼2)(6−6𝜏+9𝑠1−9𝜏𝑠1−3𝑠2+3𝜏𝑠2−5𝛼1−4𝑠1𝛼1−𝑠2𝛼1−3𝛼2−3𝑠1𝛼2)8(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2)2 , 𝜋2 = (1−𝜏)(2−2𝜏−𝑠1+𝜏𝑠1+3𝑠2−3𝜏𝑠2−𝛼1−𝑠2𝛼1+𝛼2+𝑠1𝛼2)(6−6𝜏−3𝑠1+3𝜏𝑠1+9𝑠2−9𝜏𝑠2−3𝛼1−3𝑠2𝛼1−5𝛼2−𝑠1𝛼2−4𝑠2𝛼2)8(4−4𝜏−𝛼1−𝛼2)2 .                                               (35) 
In the second stage, the differentiation of 𝜋𝑖 in Eq. (35) with respect to 𝛼𝑖 yields the following 
optimal level of CSR of the firm: 𝛼𝑖𝐵 = (1−𝜏)(7+5𝑠1+2𝑠2−𝑀)4+3𝑠1+𝑠2 ,                                                                                                   (36) 
where 𝑀 = √41 + 52𝑠1 + 16𝑠12 + 30𝑠2 + 20𝑠1𝑠2 + 5𝑠22 and 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
The resulting social welfare is 
𝑊 = (21𝑀−125𝜏+25𝑀𝜏+68𝑠1−14𝑀𝑠1−270𝜏𝑠1+20𝑀𝜏𝑠1−6𝑠12−41−70𝜏𝑠12−110𝑠2−5𝑀𝑠2+20𝜏𝑠2+5𝑀𝜏𝑠2+120𝑠1𝑠2−130𝜏𝑠1𝑠2−115𝑠22+75𝜏𝑠22)400 .                                (37) 
In the first stage, the government opts for discriminatory subsidies to maximize social welfare. 
As obtaining the explicit outcomes in the equilibrium is challenging, we use numerical 
simulations with 𝜏 ∈ (0,1). Table 2 presents the equilibrium outcomes in this model, where 
superscript “*” represents the equilibrium outcome under the discriminatory subsidy. Note that 𝑠1𝐵∗ > 0 and 𝑠2𝐵∗ <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐵∗ = 0.7842. This implies that under discriminatory subsidies, a 
domestic firm can increase its competitive advantage when competing with a foreign-owned firm. 
However, the corporate tax rate directly affects the subsidy decision of the government regarding 
a foreign-owned firm. In particular, the government taxes the output of the foreign-owned firm 
when corporate tax is low, and subsidizes the output when corporate tax is high enough.  
 [TABLE 2 should be located here.] 
Second, we consider a domestic CSR case. In the last stage, by substituting 𝛼2 = 0 into Eq. 
(35), we calculate the profit of the domestic firm. In the second stage, the differentiation of 𝜋1 
with respect to 𝛼1 yields 𝛼1 = (1−𝜏)(2+3𝑠1−𝑠2)11+6𝑠1+5𝑠2 . In the first stage, the differentiation of 𝑊 with 
respect to 𝑠𝑖  yields: 𝑠1𝐷∗ = 2(4−3𝜏)9(3−2𝜏)  and 𝑠2𝐷∗ = 3𝜏−23(3−2𝜏) . Note that 𝑠1𝐷∗ > 0  and 𝑠2𝐷∗ <> 0  when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐷∗ = 23.  The implication of discriminatory subsidies is similar to the bilateral CSR case. 
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Then, the resulting optimal CSR is 𝛼1𝐷∗ = (1−𝜏)(4−3𝜏)3(5−3𝜏) . The profit of the firm is respectively 𝜋1𝐷∗ =7(4−3𝜏)2(1−𝜏)54(3−2𝜏)2  and 𝜋2𝐷∗ = 1−𝜏6(3−2𝜏)2. Finally, the social welfare is 𝑊𝐷∗ = 5−3𝜏6(3−2𝜏).  
Third, we consider a foreign CSR case. In the last stage, by substituting 𝛼1 = 0 into Eq. (35), 
we obtain the profit of the foreign-owned firm. In the second stage, the differentiation of 𝜋2 with 
respect to 𝛼2 yields 𝛼2 = (1−𝜏)(2+3𝑠2−𝑠1)11+62+5𝑠1 . In the first stage, the differentiation of 𝑊 with respect 
to 𝑠𝑖 yields: 𝑠1𝐹∗ = 10−7𝜏23−14𝜏 and 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 7𝜏−523−14𝜏. Note that 𝑠1𝐹∗ > 0 and 𝑠2𝐹∗ <> 0 when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝐹∗ = 57. The 
implication of discriminatory subsidies is also similar to the bilateral CSR case. The resulting 
optimal CSR is 𝛼2𝐹∗ = 1−𝜏13−7𝜏. The profit of the firm is respectively 𝜋1𝐹∗ = 3(10−7𝜏)2(1−𝜏)2(23−14𝜏)2  and 𝜋2𝐹∗ =21(1−𝜏)2(23−14𝜏)2. Finally, the social welfare is 𝑊𝐹∗ = 13−7𝜏2(23−14𝜏).  
Fourth, we consider a no CSR case. In the last stage, substituting 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 0, we confirm 
the social welfare. In the first stage, the differentiation of 𝑊 with respect to 𝑠𝑖  yields: 𝑠1𝑁∗ =4−3𝜏3(3−2𝜏)  and 𝑠2𝑁∗ = 3𝜏−23(3−2𝜏) = 𝑠2𝐷∗ . Note that 𝑠1𝑁∗ > 0  and 𝑠2𝑁∗ <> 0  when 𝜏 <> 𝜏𝑁∗ = 23 . The 
implication of discriminatory subsidies is still similar to the bilateral CSR case. The profit of the 
firm is respectively 𝜋1𝑁∗ = (4−3𝜏)2(1−𝜏)6(3−2𝜏)2  and 𝜋2𝑁∗ = 1−𝜏6(3−2𝜏)2 = 𝜋2𝐷∗. Finally, the social welfare is 𝑊𝑁∗ = 5−3𝜏6(3−2𝜏) = 𝑊𝐷∗.  
Lastly, we compare the optimal levels of CSR, discriminatory subsidies, profits of the two 
firms, and social welfare among the four models. Figure 1 indicates the comparisons between the 
four models. Then, we obtain the following lemmas and propositions. 
[FIGURE 1 should be located here.] 
Proposition 6: The domestic CSR leads to the highest CSR level, while foreign CSR leads to the 
lowest CSR level under discriminatory subsidies.  
Proposition 6 implies that the discriminatory subsidy policy yields different levels of CSR 
in the two unilateral CSR cases, which is in contrast to the result under the uniform subsidy in 
Proposition 1, that is, 𝛼1𝐷∗ > 𝛼𝑖𝐵∗ > 𝛼2𝐹∗. While the government always grants (positive) an output 
subsidy to the domestic firm to increase the firm’s competitive advantage under discriminatory 
subsidies, it will choose the highest CSR level only when the domestic firm engages in CSR 
activities. In contrast, the government taxes the output of the foreign-owned firm significantly to 
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decrease the rent-leakage effect from the foreign-owned firm if 0 < 𝜏 < 57. Thus, the foreign-
owned firm will choose the lowest CSR level under foreign CSR.  
Lemma 4: The ranks of optimal discriminatory subsidies among the four models are as follows:  
(i). 𝑠1𝑁∗ > 𝑠1𝐹∗ > 𝑠1𝐵∗ > 𝑠1𝐷∗ > 0; 
(ii). 0 > 𝑠2𝐹∗ > 𝑠2𝐷∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 𝑠2𝐵∗ when 0 < 𝜏 < 14; 
(iii). 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 𝑠2𝐵∗ when 14 < 𝜏 < 1; 
(iii-1) 0 ≥ 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 𝑠2𝐵∗when 14 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐷∗;  
(iii-2) 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 0 ≥ 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 𝑠2𝐵∗ when 𝜏𝐷∗ < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐹∗; 
(iii-3) 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 0 ≥ 𝑠2𝐵∗ when 𝜏𝐹∗ < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝐵∗; 
(iii-4) 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 𝑠2𝐹∗ = 𝑠2𝑁∗ > 𝑠2𝐵∗ > 0 when 𝜏𝐵∗ < 𝜏 < 1. 
Lemma 4 presents the policy relationships between optimal discriminatory subsidies and 
corporate tax rates. First, we illustrate that the optimal discriminatory subsidy of the domestic 
firm is independent of corporate tax. In particular, to enlarge market outputs, the government 
grants the highest subsidy to the domestic firm when none of the firms engage in CSR activities. 
As domestic CSR leads to the highest CSR level, the government grants the lowest subsidy to the 
domestic firm under domestic CSR.  
Regarding the foreign-owned firm, we summarize the findings of Lemma 4 as follows: (a) min{𝑠2𝐷∗, 𝑠2𝐹∗, 𝑠2𝑁∗} > 𝑠2𝐵∗ , and (b) 𝑠2𝐹∗ >< 𝑠2𝐷∗  when 𝜏 <> 14 . First, (a) the optimal discriminatory 
subsidy of the foreign-owned firm under either unilateral CSR or no CSR is always higher than 
that under bilateral CSR. In order to decrease the over-production effect of CSR activities, the 
government will grant the lowest subsidy (or tax) to the foreign-owned firm when both firms 
engage in CSR activities, depending on the corporate tax rate. Second, (b) the optimal subsidy of 
the foreign-owned firm under foreign CSR is higher than under domestic CSR when corporate 
tax is low, while the opposite is found when corporate tax is high. Note that 0 > 𝑠2𝐹∗ >𝑠2𝐷∗when 0 < 𝜏 < 14. Thus, when corporate tax is low enough, the government imposes a lower 
tax on the foreign-owned firm under foreign CSR than under domestic CSR. However, when 
corporate tax is high, we have 𝑠2𝐷∗ > 𝑠2𝐹∗ > 0  when 𝜏𝐹∗ < 𝜏 < 1 . That is, the government 
imposes a lower subsidy on the foreign-owned firm under foreign CSR compared to domestic 
CSR. 
Lemma 5: The ranks of profits and social welfare under discriminatory subsidies are as follows: 
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(i). 𝜋1𝑁∗ > 𝜋1𝐹∗ > 𝜋1𝐵∗ > 𝜋1𝐷∗;  
(ii). 𝜋2𝐹∗ >< 𝜋2𝐷∗ = 𝜋2𝑁∗ > 𝜋2𝐵∗ when 𝜏 <> 1 − 3√714 ; 
(iii). 𝑊𝐵∗ > 𝑊𝐹∗ > 𝑊𝐷∗ = 𝑊𝑁∗.  
Lemma 5 states that the domestic firm is most profitable under no CSR, while it is the least 
profitable under domestic CSR in contrast to the result under the uniform subsidy in Lemma 3. 
Further, the foreign-owned firm generates minimum profit under bilateral CSR and maximum 
profit under foreign CSR (domestic CSR) when corporate tax is low (high). Lemma 5 also implies 
that irrespective of government policies that include discriminatory subsidies and corporate tax, 
bilateral CSR yields the highest social welfare, whereas no CSR yields the lowest social welfare. 
Note that 𝑊𝐹∗ > 𝑊𝐷∗, which contrasts with the result under the uniform subsidy in Lemma 2. 
Under discriminatory subsidies, the government can impose a higher output tax on the foreign 
firm, as per Lemma 4, and thus increase government revenue. As a result, foreign CSR leads to 
higher social welfare than domestic CSR under the discriminatory subsidy.  
Finally, we consider an endogenous choice game of CSR under discriminatory subsidies in 
which each firm decides whether to engage in CSR activities simultaneously and non-
cooperatively before the first stage of the previous analysis. 
Proposition 7: Foreign CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) 
under the discriminatory subsidy, while neither one is socially desirable. 
Proposition 7 illustrates that foreign CSR is a Nash equilibrium when 𝜏 is low, that is, 0 <𝜏 < 1 − 3√714 , while no CSR is a Nash equilibrium when 𝜏 is high, for instance, 1 − 3√714 < 𝜏 < 1. 
Moreover, both foreign CSR and no CSR are the Nash equilibria when 𝜏 =  1 − 3√714 . Note that 
this result contrasts with the result under the subsidy in Proposition 5. However, Lemma 5 reveals 
that neither one of the Nash equilibria under the discriminatory subsidy is socially desirable.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examined strategic CSR in a Cournot duopoly between domestic and foreign-
owned firms in a managerial delegation framework facing the government’s public policies. We 
then investigated how the government could combine policies to regulate the firms’ CSR behavior 
and to enhance market performance. Our main findings are as follows: first, the strategic effect 
of corporate profit tax on strategic CSR and the output subsidy policy, exists. In particular, the 
effects of corporate tax on strategic CSR and social welfare are conflicting: the strategic level of 
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CSR decreases but social welfare increases with corporate tax. These results are robust under the 
discriminatory subsidy. This finding is significant for policymakers because corporate profit taxes 
are not neutral toward firm behavior in the presence of strategic CSR. Second, the optimal 
unilateral CSR is higher than bilateral CSR under the uniform subsidy, while domestic (foreign) 
CSR leads to the highest (lowest) CSR level under the discriminatory subsidy. However, 
irrespective of corporate tax or foreign penetration, social welfare is highest under bilateral CSR. 
Finally, the Nash equilibrium of an endogenous CSR choice game depends on corporate tax and 
output subsidy policies. In particular, when corporate tax is low, domestic CSR is a Nash 
equilibrium under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR is a Nash equilibrium under the 
discriminatory subsidy. However, neither is socially desirable. Therefore, an appropriate policy 
framework on CSR guidelines is necessary for lower corporate taxes. 
Even though our methodology can be applied to different models with other public policies 
on CSR, future research avenues remain. For example, while we regarded a corporate tax as an 
exogenously given parameter in this model, the government may determine it endogenously in 
the general equilibrium model. Alternative scenarios should include product differentiation, 
Stackelberg competition, and more general specifications for the demand and cost functions 
among the oligopolistic firms. Extending our analysis to different CSR activities with 
commitment investment would be another direction for future research. 
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